

# Indicators of Compromise per la Cyber Threat Intelligence e l'Incident Response



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
Security Summit Milano 2016

- ❑ Lo scenario
  - ❑ Definizioni di *Threat & Intelligence*
  - ❑ Indicator of Compromise (IoC)
  - ❑ Cosa sono e a cosa servono gli IoC?
  - ❑ IoC – Creazione, Raccolta, Condivisione
  - ❑ Standard e Tools
- La Threat Intelligence nella realtà: SOC, MSSP

*Riferimenti sull'ultima slide*

*Disclaimer: molte definizioni sono in inglese*

## SCENARIO



## ATTIVITA'

Advisory

- Progettare e implementare

Threat Intel

- Analisi

Monitoring

- Controllo on-site

Incident  
Response

- Gestire l'attacco



## ATTORI

Advisory

- Security Partner



Threat Intel

- Managed Security Service Provider



Monitoring

- Managed Security Service Provider



Incident Response

- MSS & Security Partner



- DEFINIZIONE NELLO STANDARD ISO
  - a **potential cause of an unwanted incident**, which may result in harm to system or organization [ISO/IEC 27000:2016]
- DEFINIZIONE NIST SP 800-30
  - any circumstance **or event with the potential to adversely impact organizational operations** (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through an information system via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, or modification of information, and/or denial of service ()

## “THREAT” - DEFINIZIONI

- **CYBERTHREAT** – DHS – Department Homeland Security
  - “is any **identified effort** directed toward access to, exfiltration of, manipulation of, or impairment to the integrity, confidentiality, security, or availability of data, an application, or a federal system, without lawful authority”
  
- **IN PRATICA:**
  - “ ... *si... ma sappiamo riconoscere IN TEMPO UTILE se la minaccia diventa un VERO attacco ?!?”*



## Esempio: APT Advanced Persistent Threat

APT non è (solo) malware oppure una singola attività ostile ma definisce una serie di azioni offensive dalle seguenti caratteristiche:

**Target:** mirati su obiettivi specifici, con una strategia d'attacco complessa

**Attori:** criminali organizzati, entità governative, spie industriali, mercenari o gruppi con capacità equivalenti

**Strumenti:** sistemi di intrusione allo stato dell'arte: Malware avanzato, in combinazione con Social Engineering


**Timing:** tempi anche molto lunghi (mesi/anni)

**CONTROMISURE?**



## INTELLIGENCE

**Information** that provides relevant and sufficient **understanding** for mitigating the impact of a harmful event in the cyber domain\*



✓ **Techint:** digital footprint of technology  
**OR the forensic trails of an attack**



## THREAT INTELLIGENCE: DEFINIZIONE

**Information** that provides relevant and sufficient **understanding** for mitigating the impact of a harmful event in the cyber domain\*



## THREAT INTELLIGENCE

**Information** **about threats and threats actors** that provides relevant and sufficient **understanding** for mitigating the impact of a harmful event in the cyber domain\*

\* Bank of England

Per gestire minacce sempre più sofisticate  
è possibile adottare una delle metodologie standard  
dell'attaccante:

- la ricognizione preventiva del target!





## THREAT INTELLIGENCE vs. INFORMATION GATHERING

Usare lo stesso principio -  
una *ricognizione*: cercare elementi capaci di  
evidenziare l'attacco/compromissione  
“asap”



Non è una novità: usata da anni con elementi quali:

- ✓ Database di vulnerabilità, firme antivirus, IP/URL reputation
- ✓ Firme di traffico di rete, netflow, ecc.
- ✓ Specifici pattern di attacco evidenziati da CERT e/o Security Firms
- ✓ Forensics evidence

e infatti...:

## Esistono “**Fornitori di Threat Intelligence**”

Attenzione a cosa si compra... Non è un prodotto!

Perchè?

- ✓ Le informazioni devono essere contestualizzate
- ✓ Se sono solo liste di “Raw Data”, possono essere poco utili
- ✓ Dovrebbero fornire almeno: il meccanismo di distribuzione, gli attori, le potenziali vittime, il vettore di attacco, TTP ecc.

## THREAT INTELLIGENCE (2.0 ?)

- Le informazioni che devono essere rese disponibili:  
(ad esempio)
  - Chi mi sta attaccando? Perché?
  - Come mi stanno attaccando?
  - Stanno attaccando i miei partner/fornitori/terze parti o i miei competitors?
  - Che metodi stanno usando? Quali skill/tools?

**Ovvero servono le TTP :**  
**Tools, Tactics and Procedures**  
● **A integrazione delle evidenze**  
**“osservabili” (file, hash, IP ecc.): IoC !!**

## INDICATOR of COMPROMISE

- Gli elementi distintivi che concorrono all'utilizzo della TechInt sono gli **IoC**
- **Indicator of Compromise:** un artefatto individuato su reti o sistemi elaborativi che indica la presenza di un'intrusione informatica, con un elevato grado di confidenza \*

\*RSA Corporation

## INDICATOR of COMPROMISE


### ● Esempi di IoC:

- ❑ IP e URL (compromessi o di reputazione scadente)
- ❑ Hash (di sample, malware ecc)
- ❑ Parti di Windows Registry
- ❑ File
- ❑ Associazioni porte e applicazioni anomale
- ❑ Traffico anomalo (es: DNS malformato)


— .....

- Ma possono essere creati anche IoC “comportamentali”, ovvero **anomalie**:
  - Nel traffico di rete
  - Nell'attività di accesso ai sistemi
  - Uso di credenziali privilegiate
  - Risposte anomale a interrogazioni HTML (esempio dopo una SQL injection)


## INDICATOR of COMPROMISE



## INDICATOR of COMPROMISE LIFECYCLE



# OpenloC LIFECYCLE



***Ed è sempre più importante la  
CONDIVISIONE delle informazioni !!!***

- **Creare un IoC è semplice , ma deve essere un elemento EFFICACE ed EFFICIENTE per l'analista:**
  1. Lo IoC deve essere Specifico (indicare una modalità precisa di attacco/compromissione)
  2. Al tempo stesso deve raccogliere abbastanza informazioni da rendere complesso per l'attaccante evadere l'IoC individuato
  3. Facile da elaborare e manipolare

- CREARE IoC: Facile
- CATEGORIZZARLI: Complesso
- UTILIZZARLI: Moderatamente Complesso
- CONDIVIDERLI: Complesso

➤ **Servirebbe un Framework per gestire queste informazioni in modo strutturato..!**



- **Standard proposti per IoC:** OpenIoC, STIX, CybOX, RFC ...
- **Distribuzione degli IoC:** protocollo TAXII
- **Tool per gestire/distribuire IoC**

- *Private Company* – OpenIoC : uno dei primi e più utilizzati
- **OASIS** – STIX e TAXII (precedentemente MITRE.org)
- **OASIS** – CyBOX (precedentemente MITRE.org)
- **IETF** – RFC 5070, IODEF
- Altre proposte: YARA, MMDEF, MAEC, ....

OpenloC è un framework (un XML Schema, estendibile)

- permette di raggruppare logicamente gli artefatti digitali, che possono quindi essere trasmessi ad altre applicazioni

Gli elementi descrittivi che può gestire sono

➤ **Metadati**

➤ **Riferimenti**

➤ **Definizioni**



# ESEMPIO

## Openloc Tool



FileSearchToolsHelp

| Name                 | Created              | Updated              | Source    |
|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|-----------|
| Trojan.Malwerewolf.B | 2014-10-11 23:29:15Z | 2014-11-30 04:14:26Z | InterDimS |

Name: Trojan.Malwerewolf.B

Author: InterDimSham

GUID: 1ffd7770-1da2-4447-b72a-41c026041a07

Created: 2014-10-11 23:29:15Z

Modified: 2014-11-30 04:14:26Z

Type

Reference

groupIntel.Feed.A

threatgroupAPT-MWW

report1

categoryBackdoor

grade8

Description:

A report from A Intel Feed described APT group APT-MWW using a trojan backdoor that is being identified as Trojan.Malwerewolf.B. Since this is an APT actor using custom malware we have put a risk factor of 8. The ticket tying all our internal details is in ticket #1.

Add: AND OR Item

OR

File MD5 is d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e

File MD5 is d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e

Port Remote IP contains 127.0.0.1

UrlHistory URL contains remote.localhost:8080/mww/c2?

Network DNS contains remote.localhost

AND

OR

File Path contains \AppData\Local\Temp

File Path contains \Local Settings\Temp

OR

File Name is FILE1.exe

File Name is FILE2.exe

AND

Registry Key Path contains Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Registry Value contains FILE1.exe

AND

Registry Key Path contains Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run

Registry Value contains FILE2.exe

Comment

Comment

Content

ContentTypestring

ContentFILE2.exe

Length9

Context

DocumentRegistry\Item

SearchRegistry\Item\Value

Context Typemir

Indicator Item

ID36838b1a-5b2a-4e2b-9357-573

Conditioncontains

ID

Unique ID of the Indicator Item.

Save

Loaded IOCs: 1

27



# ESEMPIO

## Openloc Tool

File Search Tools Help

| Name                         | Created              | Updated         |
|------------------------------|----------------------|-----------------|
| Chewbacca Tor Banking Trojan | 2014-01-07 22:26:15Z | 2014-01-07 22:4 |
| Cryptowall 1.0 and 2.0       | 2014-12-04 09:31:06Z | 2014-12-04 10:5 |
| Flamer, Skywiper             | 2012-06-04 15:15:17Z | 2012-06-04 21:3 |
| Operation Windigo            | 2014-03-18 20:23:23Z | 2014-03-21 15:5 |
| STUXNET VIRUS (METHODOLOGY)  | 0001-01-01 00:00:00Z | 2011-11-04 19:3 |
| Zeus                         | 0001-01-01 00:00:00Z | 2011-10-28 19:2 |

|                                            |         |
|--------------------------------------------|---------|
| Name: Operation Windigo                    | T.. R.. |
| Author: David Westcott                     |         |
| GUID: ec3b97c8-5de7-444d-9bd9-8f868ca04748 |         |
| Created: 2014-03-18 20:23:23Z              |         |
| Modified: 2014-03-21 15:58:14Z             |         |

Description:

IOCs for Operation Windigo as described in the following report: [http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/operation\\_windigo.pdf](http://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/operation_windigo.pdf). Source: <https://github.com/eset/malware-ioc>

Add: AND OR Item ▾


OR

- ...Network String URI contains k2l8z1yeodm.info
- ...Network String URI contains o5o8clberdn.net
- ...Network String URI contains map9ultejdt.net
- ...Network String URI contains o5taclberdn.biz
- ...Network String URI contains k2zbz1yeodm.info
- ...Network String URI contains alhcylxendd.net
- ...Network String URI contains k2rdz1yeodm.biz
- ...Network String URI contains o5dec1berdn.info
- ...Network String URI contains maefultejdt.net
- ...Network String URI contains alz1h2xendd.biz
- ...Network String URI contains mae2d2tejdt.info
- ...Network String URI contains o5e4l2berdn.net
- ...Network String URI contains k2t6i2yeodm.biz
- ...Network String URI contains alk8h2xendd.info
- ...Network String URI contains k2qal2yeodm.net
- ...Network String URI contains o5lcl2berdn.biz
- ...Network String URI contains maved2tejdt.info
- ...Network String URI contains q5ncv0dekcm8alp.biz
- ...Network String URI contains oaxey7m0lde8slv.info
- ...Network String URI contains clb1jfi2pdi8w1f.net
- ...Network String URI contains oap3p6f5lde8slv.biz
- ...Network String URI contains q5y6vdf7tdm8alp.info

Save

- Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX™)
- E' un linguaggio ed un framework (XML Schema)
- Pensato per gestire le informazioni relative alle CyberThreats per i più comuni *casì d'uso*:
  - Creazione di IoC
  - Arricchimento di informazioni di contesto
  - Distribuzione degli IoC
- È molto più completo di OpenIoC, può gestire anche indicatori quali *C&C activity, data exfiltration activity, compromised login credentials ....*

# STIX USE CASES



- Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII™)
- Originariamente lanciato da Homeland Security, con le seguenti specifiche:
  - ❖ Consentire uno scambio rapido e sicuro delle informazioni sulle minacce
  - ❖ Supportare un ampio raggio di casi d'usi e practice relative alla condivisione di cyber info
  - ❖ Supportare l'uso di meccanismi esistenti
  - ❖ Perseguire l'adozione del protocollo come standard internazionale



## TOOLS

- OpenIoC
  - IoC Editor/IoC Finder, OpenIoC-to-STIX
- CyBOX
  - python-cybox,19 cybiet
- YARA
  - Yara, jsunpack
- SNORT
- STIX
  - Microsoft Interflow, CRITs, MANTIS, python-stix46
- OpenSource
  - <http://bluecloudws.github.io/ioceditor/>
  - <https://github.com/yahoo/PyIoCe>

## ● Le Community

### — Informali:

- <https://www.iocbucket.com/>
- ...

### — Formali:

- OTX – Open Threat Exchange (OSSIM )
- Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC)
  - FS-ISAC – Servizi Finanziari
  - R-CISC – Retail
  - IT-ISAC – Info technology
  - E-ISAC – Electricity

— ....

- Raccogliere IoC (sia internamente che su Internet )
- Aggiungere le informazioni di contesto (se assenti)
- Sfruttare queste informazioni! (e condividerle ...)



Incident Response Team/  
MSS



# IoC usage in MSS and IR

**Gabriele Zanoni**

EMEA Incident Response Investigator  
Symantec Cyber Security Services

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| 2 | IoC usage in a MSS provider          |
| 3 | IoC and Incident Response            |



# Technical and Adversary Intelligence



# Intelligence Has to Evolve

## Adversary Intelligence



Actors



TTPs



Campaigns



Incidents

## Technical Intelligence



Vulnerability



Network Reputation  
(IP/Domains/URLS)



Security Risk / Malcode



File Reputation

Recon

Deliver

Control

Maintain

Attack Killchain



Weaponize

Exploit

Execute

*Outside your perimeter*

*Inside your perimeter*

# Example of a Symantec MATI report (Managed Adversary Threat Intelligence)



Examples of information provided:


- Adversary Profile
- Campaigns
- Timeline of the attacks
- Attackers' accounts on Socials
- Tactics/Techniques/Procedures
- Indicators of Compromise
- Metadata (Source Region / Target Region / Threat Domain)
- Etc..



# IoC usage in a MSS provider



# IoC usage inside a Managed Security Service provider




## Correlation activities inside MSS


- Examples of IoC based correlations:
  - Network Device (e.g. firewall, router, proxy etc..) correlation: discover network flows going to IP addresses marked as Attack / Bot / CnC / Fraud / Malware / Phishing / Spam.
  - Managed Adversary Threat Intelligence (MATI) correlation: discover if a specific hacking group is targeting an organization.
  - Other data correlation: check of attacking patterns in our Global Intelligence Network
- Examples of correlations with other detection engines:
  - Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA)
  - OSINT from Internet leaked data
  - Smoke detector: use of big data and machine learning techniques to identify "low-and-slow" threats.

*This example clearly demonstrates how MSS has improved a customer's security protection and reduced their risk profile in a very quick time frame.*


## Security Incidents per Month




# During Feb. 2016 MSS detected ~30K Incidents just for EMEA customers



# Drill down




# Drill down



Drill down

*If you do not have a reliable and accurate source of intelligence you are blind on 40%-50% of critical incidents!*





# IoC and Incident Response



# IoC usage in Incident Response activities


- Examples:
  - **APT Hunting:** detect if networks/servers have been already compromised, such detection is done using IoC and EDR tools. We enrich the indicators with extra intelligence that is designed to find not just definitive bad, but also artefact of bad ( key reg, file path, other files dropped etc..).
  - **Malicious flow detection:** the correlation is performed using a reputational feeds with malicious IP addresses/Domains/URLs.
  - **Identify attackers during an incident:** the TTP could be used to identify if an attack is part of a specific attacking campaigns and reveal the attacker's group.
  - **Preparation:** check of the relevant TTP in order to prepare tailored defending capabilities (e.g. tabletop exercises etc..).

## A story from the trench

- Customer called the IR Team sharing details of an incident.
- After the triage call, the IR Team did a deep investigation into intelligence to check other attacks on the same customer's vertical.
- We checked potential Adversary Profiles and we found evidences of the same kind of attack into MATI reports.
- IR Team deployed at customer's premise was fulfilled with all relevant IoC and has timely detected a known pattern of attack related to a specific attackers' group.
- Thanks to MATI info, the IR Team was also able to found new malicious binaries and related IoC.
- New signatures have been created and shared with MSS.
- New rules have been ran across all MSS customers.

# Cyber Security Services

Intelligent | Vigilant | Responsive | Ready





# Thank you!

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