

#### Total Visibility. Focused Protection.

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#### Vulnerability and Threat Trends

2018 Mid-Year Update Skybox Security Research Lab

#### CVEs by Year and CVSS Level



THE

#### CVEs by Year and CVSS Level



>8,500 new CVEs



Source: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln-metrics/ visualizations/cvss-severity-distribution-over-time





Vulnerabilities Exploited in the Wild

Source: Skybox Research Lab





#### THE YEAR OF CRYPTO MINING

Cryptomining instead of ransomware



Malware Families by Types

Second Half of 2017 First Half of 2018



## Vulnerability Exploited In The Wild

- When we look at all the vulnerabilities exploited in the wild (not only via EKs), we see similar patterns:
  - A few vulnerabilities that are very popular, are accountable for a big portion of the damage
  - Many of these vulnerabilities are old and a patch is available for years
  - Many of these vulnerabilities have a relatively-low CVSS score

85% of exploited vulnerabilities were **more than 2 years old** 



- IBM X-Force/Analysis by Gartner, September 2016



### Security Management Gap





## Improving Vulnerability Management

"To truly manage vulnerabilities and not play Whac-AMole with scan findings, you need to trust your asset management, understand how your vulnerabilities fit into the context of your organization, and be able to analyze the paths attackers might take in that context."

- Verizon Data Breach Incident Report 2018





#### Vulnerability Management in 2018

Silicon Valley HQ Offices around the globe

#### Fastest-growing company in our space \$270M funding since February 2016

#### who we An

5–star reviews Vulnerability/Threat Management Risk/Policy Management

700+ active customers 50 countries, all verticals



#### Asset Management



Central repository with unprecedented visibility of all assets, their location and their business function

#### Asset Management





### Asset Management



- Visualize your entire attack surface from multiple perspectives
- Display data in formats useful to security and business-oriented stakeholders



#### It all starts with modeling the Attack Surface





120+ technology integrations

## Skybox Security Intelligence Feed

#### Skybox Research Lab



700,000+ sites in the dark web

# Image: 10 state30+ securityImage: 10 statedata feeds

Exploits in the wild

Vulnerabilities used in ransomware, exploit kits, etc.

Attack vector details



#### **Threat-Centric Vulnerability Management**



Source: Skybox Security Dictionary – September 2018

### More Options in Remediation



## Skybox Security Suite



#### Integrated Security Management

- Total visibility of the attack surface
  - Traditional IT
  - Virtual and cloud
  - Operational technology
  - Vulnerabilities and threats
- Built for large, complex networks
- One platform, many solutions



#### Vulnerability Management in the next years

## Security in Multi-Cloud Environments



**Complete Visibility** 

#### End-to-end path analysis

Policy compliance across networks in a single dashboard view

Out-of-the-box regulatory compliance checks

Threat-centric vulnerability management

### Security in Industrial Networks

Visibility and path analysis for combined IT and OT networks

**Risk analysis** 

Vulnerability detection







#### Managing Security Across IT and OT Networks

## **Operational Technology is everywhere**

Financial Services





Oil & Gas

Building Management Systems (BMS)

Drilling and Distribution Process

Energy

Power Generation and Distribution

Transportation



Telecom



Health

Signaling, traffic control, Naval Ports, Airports

Cell Tower management system

PACS, Health Sensors, BMS



## **ICS/Scada Security Demand Drivers**









OT and IT Convergence Nation led Cyber Warfare & Geopolitical conflicts

Successful ICS Breaches Regulatory Compliance



## Key Challenges in Industrial Networks

Closed, proprietary technology

Managed and installed on outdated IT systems

IP connectivity transformation, derived by ICS vendors

Organizational challenges

Many flaws, no security mechanisms, protocols are easily exploitable

Lots of vulnerabilities at the software stack, no vendor support

Exposure to corporate IT threats, malicious insiders

OT and IT speak different languages



#### Key Security Requirements in Industrial Networks

#### Visibility

Vulnerability Management

#### **Threat Detection**

**Compliance Reporting** 

Ability to discover and show IT and OT assets as well as the Network connectivity & Access

IT and OT Vulnerability Analysis, including Exposure and Exploited in the wild

Anomaly detection of malwares/attacks in the network

Automated reporting on compliance with best practices such as ISA99,NERC CIP, FISMA



## Skybox OT Sensor

- Linux based (Virtual Appliance or Physical)
- Broadest ICS Protocol support
  - DNP3
  - IEC 104
  - IEC 61850 (MMS, GOOSE, SV)
  - ICCP
  - Synchrophasor
  - Modbus/TCP
  - EtherNet/IP (including Rockwell)
  - OPC-DA/AE
  - Profinet
  - BACnet
  - Proprietary protocols from ABB, Emerson, Honeywell, Siemens, Yokogawa
  - 30+ IT protocols, including SMB/CIFS and DCOM

Passively collected information includes:

- IP/MAC address
- Vendor and model (depending on protocols)
- Device role
- Protocols/services, commands
- Number of links and data flows to other devices
- Sent/received bytes
- OS version and host name (depending on protocols)
- Network topology
- ISA99 Level (0-4)



### Putting al the pieces together



### Complete IT & OT Network Model



#### Use Case: Permissive access from Field Devices to Corporate IT

Skybox - Access Analyzer						- 0
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#### Use Case: Vulnerability Detection on OT assets





#### Use Case: WannaCry Propagation Path from IT to OT



### The Skybox Difference





#### Thank You!

### Visit us at Skybox Security booth for more info and a quick demo of our capabilities

